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Many groups are interested in the insider threat prob-
lem, but the model generally used by all of these
groups is implicitly binary—one is either within a
perimeter or not. There is another model, however,
that employs a graduated approach to defining insid-
ers. This approach gives greater flexibility for con-
sidering many threats that are not traditionally cap-
tured by a model, such as the impact of social engi-
neering attacks. This new definition enables more
accurate and useful security policies to be imple-
mented so that well-defined insiders can be deterred,
detected, and analyzed. We examine the flexibility of
this model in this paper through case studies, show-
ing how the model captures both traditional insiders
and social engineering attacks.
1 Introduction
Studies of the insider problem predate computers
by hundreds of years. Most of those studies have
considered insiders in a binary way—someone is ei-
ther inside some defined perimeter, or they are not.
However, the concept of a well-defined perimeter is
disappearing—particularly with regard to computer
systems [13]—as organizations hire contractors, out-
source to other organizations, partner and merge,
and use software-as-a-service (SaaS) offerings such as
SalesForce.com as part of their core business. As a
result, a strict definition of insiders based on a de-
fined perimeter is becoming less meaningful, in the
same way that traditional computer security defenses
such as firewalls and network intrusion detection sys-
tems no longer protect against attacks (including
mistakes) occurring on the inside, including Trojan
horses, phishing, and client-side, cross-site scripting
attacks.
The use of a binary definition of an insider does
not allow for the prioritization or categorization of
insiders; all insiders are considered equal. Such an
approach does not allow for an efficient division of
resources, and the focus is diverted away from pro-
tecting an organization’s most valuable assets or in-
tellectual property. As a result, traditional models of
insiders are often not useful components of a mean-
ingful risk analysis that allows management and secu-
rity administrators to prioritize resources and effort.
We have previously presented a definition of an in-
sider, using a concept that we call Attribute-Based
Group Access Control [4], and have extended that
model into a usable framework for categorizing insid-
ers, using a hierarchy of policies [3]. In this paper,
we demonstrate the utility of that approach through
two case studies. The first case study illustrates how
the framework applies to the traditional notion of
an insider. To demonstrate that this framework also
applies to other circumstances not commonly consid-
ered during the creation of insider threat definitions
and models, we present a case study where we apply
our model to an embezzlement scandal and a “spear-
phishing” attack.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2 we describe related work. We then describe
the initial definitions of insiders in Section 3, followed
by a framework based on this approach in Section 4.
We provide a case study analysis of how this model
performs given traditional insiders in Section 5, while
in Section 6 we describe how the model captures so-
cial engineering attacks. We then provide some con-
cluding remarks in Section 7.
2 Related Work
Many researchers have investigated the problem of
insider threat. However, most publications do not
precisely define an insider, instead proceeding to talk
about defenses while assuming that the user inher-
ently understands the term. But without a consistent
definition of an insider, researchers have developed
their own definitions particular to their own data sets,
situations, biases and assumptions.
As a result, research into the detection or mitiga-
tion of insider threats can not necessarily be applied
from one domain to another as the underlying model
does not necessarily translate between domains. The
situation is further complicated by definitions which
are not only ambiguous but contradictory. For exam-
ple, a RAND report defines an insider as “an already
trusted person with access to sensitive information
and information systems” ([5], p. xi). Elsewhere
it defines an insider as “someone with access, priv-
ilege, or knowledge of information systems and ser-
vices” ([5], p. 10), omitting the need for that person
to be trusted. A different report implicitly defines
the insider as anyone operating inside the security
perimeter ([14], p. 3), again ignoring trust and also
knowledge of the systems.
The problem of defining an insider complicated by
the assumption that a perimeter can even be defined
to begin with, such that someone inside the perime-
ter is therefore an insider. However, the concept of
distinct borders around an organization are blurring
with the increased usage of mobile computing, out-
sourcing and contracting. Even in those cases where
a distinct border can be defined, many definitions fo-
cus on technology borders and fail to consider physi-
cal borders and the ability to circumvent borders (for
example, by social engineering).
Consider the definition given in the 2005 U.S. Se-
cret Service and CERT report which defines an in-
sider as “individuals who were, or previously had
been, authorized to use the information systems they
eventually employed to perpetrate harm” ([11], p. 3).
This presents a narrow view of an insider and im-
plicitly hints at the existence of a security perimeter
separating those who are authorized (insiders) from
those who are unauthorized.
Using the USSS/CERT definition, we are unable
to capture the insider threat posed by a disgruntled
janitor with physical access to information systems
but without the authorization to use them. We are
also unable to capture individuals with no access de-
fined in the organization at all. For example, con-
sider a discontent teen with access to a parent’s lap-
top. Social engineering further complicates the pic-
ture. What if an attacker is able to trick an insider
into revealing sensitive information? These examples
blur the security perimeter separating an insider from
the outside.
These issues surface in other definitions as well. In
their 2005 model of insider threat assessment, Chin-
chani et al. [7] define insiders as “legitimate users
who abuse their privileges.” However, despite the
narrow definition of an insider, they acknowledge that
the perimeter between insider and outsider is “fuzzy”
and that insider threat involves both “computational
elements and human factors.”
The notion that defining a perimeter separating in-
sider from outsider is difficult at best is not new. For
example, Schultz in 2002 touches on this in his frame-
work for understanding insider attacks [18]. Despite
this knowledge, the community still implicitly relies
largely on perimeter-based definitions of who is an
insider.
When attempting to model the insider threat, we
must examine both who is the “insider” and what
is the “threat” presented by the insider. Before we
present our definition of an insider, we explore why
insiders pose a threat to institutions and organiza-
tions. This allows us to explore different categories
of insider threat, and how this affects the notion of
an “insider” in different scenarios.
Understanding the inherent limitations of a secu-
rity policy is critical to understanding the extent of
the threats posed by insiders. The first limitation is
that some policies cannot be implemented on a com-
puter system at all, leaving the organization vulnera-
ble due to lapses in procedures or worse, due to mis-
understandings about what the policy actually says.
A second limitation is with policies: while follow-
ing the principle of least privilege is the ideal situ-
ation [17], individuals typically have more privileges
than necessary to complete an authorized task. For
example, as we indicated earlier, employees need to
be able to do their jobs, and it is rare that their privi-
leges are exactly equal to their needs. Thus privileges
are nearly impossible to get “just right.” Privileges
are almost always either too restrictive (which frus-
trates the employee and impedes work), or not re-
strictive enough (which introduces unnecessary priv-
ileges that can be abused). We now explore the lim-
itations of policy and its relation to insider threat.
3 Definition
Bishop [2] proposed a definition of an insider as: “a
trusted entity that is given the power to violate one
or more rules in a given security policy . . . the in-
sider threat occurs when a trusted entity abuses that
power.” This definition hints at the need to recognize
that an insider must be determined with reference to
some set of rules that is part of a security policy. We
expanded that definition [4, 3] by arguing that a se-
curity policy is inherently represented by the access
control rules employed by an organization. So, an in-
sider is defined with regard to two primitive actions:
1. violation of a security policy using legitimate ac-
cess, and
2. violation of an access control policy by obtaining
unauthorized access.
In the first case, the insider uses their legitimate ac-
cess to perform some action that is contrary to the
security policy, such as might be observed when sensi-
tive data is leaked to some third party or when access
to a resource is given or blocked. Here the insider
has legitimate access to the data or resources, but
uses that access to provide the information to some-
one who does not themselves have access (or to deny
access to someone who does have access). In the sec-
ond case, the insider uses their access to extend their
privileges in a manner that breaks both the access
control and security policies. An example of such a
breach occurs when a user might have a legitimate
capability to log into a particular system, but then
abuses that privilege to gain illegitimate superuser-
level access to the system (e.g., by exploiting some
system vulnerability such as a buffer overflow or race
condition).
As we discussed earlier, previous definitions gave
rules or descriptions intended to allow the reader to
determine who is an insider, resulting in a binary
distinction: an entity is either an insider or not an
insider. We argue that a non-binary approach is re-
quired, to indicate degrees of “insiderness,” and that
the access control rules for an organization can be
used to develop these degrees. We define someone
as an insider with respect to access to some data or
resource X.
4 Framework
In order to capture this notion of insider as a function
of access to data or resources, and develop it into a
usable framework. To do this, we initially developed
a model called Attribute-Based Group Access Control
(ABGAC) [4], which, when merged with Carlson’s
Unifying Policy Hierarchy [6], becomes a usable and
implementable framework.
ABGAC is a generalization of role-based ac-
cess control (RBAC). Whereas RBAC largely assigns
rights based on specific job functions that a person
has within an organization, ABGAC assign rights
based on general attributes, which might include ele-
ments of person’s job function, but may also include a
variety of other sources regarding the person or their
environment.
We define attributes as descriptions of the protec-
tion domain of entities. The protection domain can
include access rights to objects and resources, includ-
ing systems, printers, documents, buildings, and gen-
erally any other object to which a user can have ac-
cess. The protection domain can also include proce-
dural access rights such as physical presence, or the
ability to block access.
Once defined, the protection domains need to be
partially ordered by value. The organization must
do a cost/benefit analysis to assign a value to the
protection domains. For example, an organization
might specify that access to financial documents, the
email of senior level executives, and source code for
specific products represents the information poten-
tially of greatest value and, therefore, represents the
greatest damage if leaked or compromised. The value
of a protection domain of a user should not be de-
fined solely by a systems administrator, but rather
as a joint effort between the senior executives and
the security administrators. Once ordered, the pro-
tection domains can be combined into groups, where
the group indicates the threat level a particular set
of attributes represents. These are called pd-groups
to distinguish them from groups of users.
Paired with each protection domain is the group
composed of the users to which that protection do-
main applies. In other words, groups are created
based on the protection domains of the associated
users, rather than on the job functions of the asso-
ciated users (as in a role-based system). The users
with access to the pd-groups with the highest value
then represent those users who pose the greatest risk
for insider threat. Given this pairing, we can create
a lattice based on the ordering of protection domains
and the ordering of groups. Given two pairs, we can
determine which indicates the greatest risk by their
ordering.
The creation of such a lattice requires a two-stage
approach: determining the important components of
the protection domain relevant to some privilege and
identifying all users. It is not necessary to provide
all components and privileges, but rather only those
that are relevant to the well-being of the organization
and therefore at risk due to insider threat. Initial
users include not only direct employees, but also all
contractors and out-sources (e.g., technical, clerical,
janitorial), and any “special case” accesses (such as
facility visitors or guest logins). Once the protection
domains and users have been identified, the two are
mapped together based on the access the users have.
This creates an ordered group of users who represent
insiders, where the ordering is based on the value
of the resources to which they have access. Thus a
security administrator can focus their attention on
those insiders who pose the greatest threat, and an
insider is thus defined with respect to the resources
to which he has access.
Degree of insider abuse and job function may be
very different, but we assert that the actual level
of threat is much more important than the level of
threat implied by a job function (which may or may
not be true). So, by employing attributes and pro-
tection domains for the lattice rather than roles we
are able to specify and group disparate users who
might have equal access in terms of insider abuse
rather than simply by job function. For example, as-
sume that the CEO of a company has identified the
customer contact and purchase information as high-
priority information that requires protection. Users
who might have access to this information, and hence
be placed in a group together, would include not only
the sales representatives for the company, but also
potentially external entities, such as the system ad-
ministrators for SalesForce.com (assuming that the
organization uses SalesForce.com). This is an exam-
ple of the disappearance of a well-defined perimeter
for an organization, and how ABGAC is able to still
capture potential insider threats.
We have since extended the ABGAC model to in-
clude the notion of using policy discrepancies to iden-
tify initial locations for insiders [3]. The extended
model builds on Carlson’s Unifying Policy Hierar-
chy [6], which defines four levels of policy (from high-
est to lowest): oracle policies, Feasible Policies, Con-
figured Policies, and Real-Time Policies, as shown in
Fig. 1. The Oracle Policy is a policy that assumes
perfect knowledge (including, for example, intent of
a transaction). The Feasible Policy implements the
Oracle Policy as best it can given real-world con-
straints (for example, a Feasible Policy will only be
able to allow or disallow a transaction, but cannot
determine the actual intent behind a transaction).
The Configured Policy is the actual policy that has
been implemented, since some Feasible Policies might
be configured in multiple ways; the Configured Pol-
icy represents the choices made in implementing the
Feasible Policy. Finally, the Real-Time Policy rep-
resents the policy decisions being made as they are
Unifying Policy Hierarchy
Level Domain Description
Oracle Policy all possible
(s, o, a, e) tuples
Captures notion of an “ideal policy”
even if such a policy isn’t explicitly
defined.
Feasible Policy system-definable
(s, o, a) tuples
Represents what can in practice can
be captured on an actual system.
Configured Policy system-defined
(s, o, a) tuples
Represents the policy as configured
on an actual system.
Real-Time Policy system-defined
(s, o, a) tuples
Represents what is possible on an ac-
tual system.
s: subject o: object a: action e: environment/intent
Figure 1: Four levels of Carlson’s Unifying Policy Hierarchy [6].
made, and take into consideration other issues such
as system constraints.
We argue that the ability to perform an insider at-
tack comes from a discrepancy in the expressiveness
(and therefore enforceability) between two policy lay-
ers. As given in the example above, an Oracle Policy
might specify the intent behind a transaction as de-
termining if a transaction should be allowed, however
the Feasible Policy has no ability to determine intent.
Thus an insider might have the capability to perform
a particular transaction, and might decide to abuse
that capabiity as part of some insider attack. The
discrepancy between the Feasible Policy (where the
transaction is allowed) and the Oracle Policy (where
the transaction is allowed only for specific reasons)
allows this attack to occur. These two aspects of the
model combine to provide a framework for discussing
the insider threat problem, and for defining who is
an insider.
From a practical, implementation perspective, we
can merge the ABGAC model into a model of at-
tacks for improved forensic analysis, simply by mon-
itoring the use of credentials on sensitive documents.
While security policies must identify the sensitive
documents and high levels of access to begin with,
the forensic model helps to determine what is needed
to understand the path to the objects, and the actions
taken on them. The two models can also jointly iden-
tify where we cannot easily enforce policies by logging
information, and thus provides a measure of how well
an attempted threat to security can or cannot be de-
termined in a post mortem analysis.
5 Case Study 1: Union Dime
Embezzlement
In the years from 1970 to 1973, the Union Dime Sav-
ings Bank lost U.S. $1.5 million to embezzlement at
the hands of Je´roˆme Kerviel, their chief teller. The
scheme would likely have lasted longer had there
not been an unrelated arrest of Kerviel’s gambling
bookie, whose records resulted in his investigation
and eventual conviction.
As chief teller, Kerviel was able to issue an “er-
ror correction” to accounts that reduced the digitally
recorded account balance. He then pocketed the re-
mainder in hard cash. When the time came for inter-
est calculations, he would move money from other ac-
counts into the account he ‘corrected’ so the balance
would appear as expected and interest was properly
calculated.
The embezzlement was enabled by several of the
bank’s practices. There were two types of accounts
whose interest was calculated on different days, al-
lowing money to be shifted from one account type to
the other on the day interest was calculated. This
allowed account records to appear balanced despite
the teller’s pocketing of money after issuing correc-
tions. In addition, customers received no monthly
statements. An account’s balance was recorded on a
customer’s booklet stamped at the time of deposit.
Any adjustments to the bank’s records would not be
reflected until the customer’s next withdraw, making
low activity accounts an attractive target.
First, we fit this into our policy hierarchy. We em-
phasize that the following is one reasonable interpre-
tation of the policy hierarchy. Others give similar
results. We assume that the Oracle Policy states
that “the chief teller can issue error corrections to ac-
counts to correct errors in data entry.” The feasible
Oracle Policy cannot distinguish between an “error
in data entry” and “an error arising from illicit with-
drawal.” Thus, the feasible Oracle Policy eliminates
the motivation behind the error correction, and sim-
ply says “the chief teller can issue error corrections
to accounts to correct errors.” Here, the chief teller
is complying with the feasible Oracle Policy (because
he is authorized to issue error corrections to accounts
to correct errors) but not with the Oracle Policy (be-
cause the error being corrected is not related to an er-
ror in data entry; it arises from an illicit withdrawal).
Now consider a variant of the feasible Oracle Policy
that says “the chief teller can issue error corrections
to accounts to correct errors, and shall record the rea-
son for each error correction in a log.” Now, when an
auditor checks the accounts, the auditor can deter-
mine whether the chief teller issued the correction to
fix a data entry error. But consider the next layer of
policy, where the system is configured to record the
log. If the log can only be made writable and not
append-only, the chief teller can erase entries to hide
that a change was made (and thus suppress the need
to enter a reason). So, if the configuration policy
says “the chief teller can write (edit) the log associ-
ated with error corrections to accounts,” then there is
a discrepancy between the Configured Policy (which
says that the chief teller can change anything in the
log) and the feasible Oracle Policy (which says the
chief teller’s reason for changing the account must be
recorded in the log).
Note also the discrepancy between the Configured
Policy, the feasible Oracle Policy, and the Oracle Pol-
icy. The Oracle Policy asserts that the chief teller’s
reason for changing the account is known, at least
to the oracle, which can then pass on whether the
reason and the change comply with its policy. But
the feasible Oracle Policy says nothing about motive,
merely that the teller record the reason for change.
Similarly, the Configured Policy simply says the chief
teller can write to the log, and nothing about what
he must write. Hence there is a discrepancy on mul-
tiple levels: the chief teller can lie. Underlying this
assertion is the Oracle Policy’s ability to discern the
actual reason for an act, and the inability of policies
at other layers in the policy hierarchy to know the
actual reason.
Given all this, we can integrate the ABGAC model
to determine where insiders might arise. Let us as-
sume the oracle, feasible oracle, and Configured Pol-
icy as above. The resources involved in this episode
of the Union Dime Bank are the cash in the bank,
and the ability to take it physically from the bank;
and the error correcting function and the ability to
execute it. The tellers have access to the cash in the
bank, as do those with access to the bank vault. As-
suming the tellers are not searched when they leave,
they also have the ability to take the cash physically
from the bank. The question of who can execute the
error correcting function limits the set of tellers to
the chief teller, assuming correct implementation (a
point we shall touch on in a moment). Thus, the set
of people who can perform the above insider attack,
namely embezzle funds in the manner described, is
one: the chief teller.
The above analysis makes two assumptions. The
first is that only one person is involved. The execu-
tion of the error correcting function requires the chief
teller to act, so he must be involved in this compro-
mise. But he need not be the one who takes the cash
out of the bank. He could be in cahoots with one
or more other tellers, who will remove the money for
him. Such a compromise is feasible, but less likely
to succeed due to Benjamin Franklin’s claim, “three
may keep a secret, if two of them are dead” [9].
The second assumption is that the implementation
of the Configured Policy is correct. For example, sup-
pose there is a bug in the software managing the er-
ror correction routine. Then the Real-Time Policy is
that anyone with access to the system on which that
routine resides can change the amounts in accounts,
thereby performing the same function as the chief
teller. Thus, the ABGAC analysis captures those
attackers who exploit implementation bugs (or, more
properly, discrepancies between the Real-Time Pol-
icy and the configuration policy) in the same way it
captures those who can exploit discrepancies between
the higher layers of policy abstraction.
The application of ABGAC to this scenario pro-
vides a basis for identifying the threat. In doing
so, it also provides a basis for mitigating the threat
ahead of time, as well as instrumenting a system in
a way that [15, 16] enables targeted logging of po-
tential violations of the security policy, and there-
fore, more efficient analysis the whether a violation
was attempted and successful. Specifically, the AB-
GAC model gives a benchmark of where logging is
(a) feasible, and (b) useful. Where logging is not fea-
sible, we can place bounds on the possible gaps in
our levels of knowledge and attempt other forms of
monitoring (e.g., physical security). Where logging
is not useful, we can avoid taxing computer and net-
work resources collecting useless data. In the place
of the bank teller example, we can certainly isolate
the bank teller and the systems and accounts that
the bank teller has access to, and by generating at-
tack graphs, starting with the teller’s likely, ultimate
goals (and/or the largest threats)—embezzlement—
we can develop metrics that might help the other
possible paths to accomplish those goals (e.g., col-
laborating with other bank employees), and monitor
and protect accordingly.
Embezzlement is a particularly good demonstra-
tion of the insider model, and is broadly applicable in
other such situations. For example, one might imag-
ine that the French bank Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale wished
they had been able to perform a better risk analy-
sis by classifying insiders, threats, and targets using
such a system before losing U.S. $7.1 billion [8].
6 Case Study 2: Social Engi-
neering
Phishing as a security issue has traditionally been
viewed as a social engineering attack and identity
theft threat. However, it can also be viewed as a
special case of the insider problem. In a phishing at-
tack, the adversary sends an email to a target group
soliciting them to perform some action that will re-
veal the target’s credentials (to some target location)
or sensitive information [1]. For example, the adver-
sary might have set up a fake web site emulating a
popular bank. He then sends email to some large
number of email addresses, where the email appears
to be an official communication from the bank. The
email might encourage the user to “follow the link
below” to log in and perform some action. As the
link is actually to the fake web site, the adversary
is then able to capture the credentials of the target
user. Note that in this case the attack is indiscrim-
inant and succeeds due to the large number of users
targeted.
Related to phishing attacks are spear phishing and
whaling [12]. Spear phishing refers to attacks that
are targeted at particular individuals or companies,
rather than indiscriminant as in generic phishing at-
tacks. Whaling is a special case of spear phishing
that is aimed at company executives.
In this section we examine two examples of phish-
ing. First we consider the more generic (and preva-
lent) forms of phishing, and then we provide an ex-
ample specific to spear phishing.
Given these descriptions, the insider attack occurs
with respect to the target organization and not the
individual. In the case of phishing, for example, the
adversary might be trying to gain an individual’s cre-
dentials in order to log into that individual’s bank
account and transfer funds to the adversary’s PayPal
account or make online purchases. Here the bank
would be the target organization. The Oracle Pol-
icy in this case might be “Only the owner of an
account can access and perform transactions using
that account.” In contrast, the Feasible Policy would
state, “Only someone presenting the credentials of
the owner of an account can access and perform trans-
actions using that account.” Note that the Feasible
Policy can not distinguish the owner of an account
except through the use of his credentials. Thus any
person providing those credentials is assumed to be
the owner of the account. In this case the Configured
Policy is the same as the Feasible Policy.
Translating this into the ABGAC model we have
as resources the account at the bank and the money
in that account, while the users are the person own-
ing that account, the employees of the bank, and the
adversary. In this case the account owner has access
to the account and the money in that account, as do
the bank employees, while the adversary does not.
The insiders for this account are therefore the bank
employees and the account owner. When the adver-
sary obtains the account owner’s credentials, he is
the account owner from the perspective of the bank.
Thus the adversary is also now an insider.
The examples for spear phishing (or whaling) are
slightly different from the more general forms of
phishing. In these cases often the email exchange
aims to gather the trust of the target, enticing him to
install some piece of software [10]. Often it achieves
this trust by providing a sufficient amount of identi-
fying information that the target believes the adver-
sary is who he claims to be. The software installed
is generally some form of malware, such as a keylog-
ger, that then sends information back to the adver-
sary. This is interesting as an insider threat problem
because, techically, the adversary never operates in-
side the perimeter of the target organization, however
he does receive that organization’s information (e.g.,
logged keystrokes, particular files). However, using
the poicy discrepancy and ABGAC models, this case
can be represented as an insider problem.
Assuming the case of a keylogger that sends in-
formation back to the adversary, the Oracle Policy
might state “this computer can send information to
other machines on the network upon explicit approval
of the user.” However, the Feasible Policy might be
less restrictive: “This computer can send informa-
tion to other machines on the network if the user is
logged in.” The assumption here might be that if the
user is logged in (which is easy to determine—at least
that some user is logged in, using this user’s creden-
tials) then he approves of the communication being
sent since he is (presumably) the one sending it. In
contrast, requiring explicit approval for all communi-
cation requests would likely be onerous for the user
(e.g., needing to approve all web browsing activity,
every email sent, etc.). Thus the computer program,
which logs the keystrokes of the user and then sends
the information back to the adversary, acts as an in-
sider activity. The adversary, although always exter-
nal to the host machine and network, is the insider
as he gains insider knowledge based on the keystroke
logging he receives. This is possible due to the gap
due to assuming that a user who is logged in is there-
fore explicitly approving all communications between
his computer and any outside systems.
This can be translated into the ABGAC model by
stating the resources as being access to the particular
system, the information on that system, and the new
information entered and activities performed on that
system. The users for this system are the user with
legitimate access to this system (e.g., the employee,
CEO, etc.) and the adversary (along with others,
such as system administrators). In this case, due to
the presence of the keylogger, while the two users are
separate with regards to access to the system and the
information on that system, they can be grouped to-
gether regarding the new information gathered and
activities performed on that system. Thus the adver-
sary in this case is an insider.
7 Conclusion
In our previous work, we proposed an approach to
defining insiders that takes the the current state of
organizations, computer networks, and mobile com-
puting into account by re-evaluating perimeters and
binary distinctions. The approach provides a basis
for gaining traction toward measuring, monitoring,
and mitigating the insider threat. While the major-
ity of research implicitly defines an insider as a binary
condition (one is either an insider or not), we take the
approach of defining an insider based on their access
attributes. More specifically, we have defined a lat-
tice consisting of protection domains on one axis and
users (not roles) on the other axis. By ordering pro-
tection domains based on their value, we can then
group them by their value. By then grouping users
according to the value of their protection domains,
we can provide a continuum of insiders. This allows
researchers and security personnel to focus on the in-
siders who can cause the greatest amount of damage
to an organization, and to develop policies and solu-
tions for reducing the threat of those insiders.
In this paper we summarize our previous work and
apply the approach to two case studies that demon-
strate the utility of our approach. While our previous
work has been largely theoretical, we focus here on
the utility of our appraoch and its capability to rep-
resent multiple forms of insiders. We demonstrate
how the model can be applied in both traditional in-
sider cases (e.g., embezzlement) as well as in social
engineering threats (e.g., phishing). Old threats are
increasing in severity due to the speed at which they
can occur, and the ability of computer networks to
provide rapid, anonymous communication, whereas
traditional threats required in-person, human con-
tact, which was slower, more complicated, and more
dangerous. In both of these case studies, we have
shown the model allows for finer-grained and more
appropriate classification of the threat scenarios. We
also briefly demonstrated how the classification and
identification of the threats can be merged with a
model of attacks to guide a post mortem analysis.
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